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Non-technical Summary
The regulation of fixed-term contracts (FTCs) in Germany has been in the focus
of the political debate for many years. FTCs were liberalised in Germany in order
to raise the flexibility of the labour market. The main feature of FTCs is that they
constitute temporary employment relationships which do not raise any institutional
firing costs when the contract runs out. 
However, there is no empirical evidence which confirms that FTC employment
raises the flexibility of the German labour market. Available empirical studies
using industry level data find no significant effect of the deregulation of FTCs in
1985 on employment adjustment. Possible explanations for these findings are that
institutional firing costs are of minor importance to adjustment, that works councils
or unions are able to pressure firms into converting more FTCs into permanent jobs
than they wish, that FTCs are rather used for screening prospective candidates than
to promote adjustment or that the employment of FTCs reduces the turnover of
permanent workers so that the flexibility of total employment is smaller than
expected. 
In this paper dynamic labour demand models are estimated with the IAB-
Establishment Panel in order to investigate the impact of FTC employment on
firms’ flexibility. By comparing the adjustment of total employment to the
adjustment of permanent employment (which is defined as total employment less
FTC employment) it is found that the 4.3 percent FTCs in the dataset increase the
median adjustment by 0.2 to 3.0 months, depending on the specification. These
results imply that FTCs are used by firms as a measure for adjustment and not only
as an instrument for screening candidates for permanent jobs. 
The empirical analysis finds no evidence for a higher wage elasticity of FTC
employment. 
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Abstract
Fixed-term labour contracts were liberalised in Germany in order to
raise the flexibility of the labour market. However, empirical studies
using industry-level data find no significant effect of FTCs on em-
ployment adjustment. This paper investigates the impact of FTC
employment on firms’ flexibility by estimating dynamic labour de-
mand models with the IAB-Establishment Panel for West Germany
in 1996-2000. Using a GMM estimator and comparing the estimated
adjustment of total employment to the adjustment of permanent
contract employment some evidence is found that FTCs raise firms’
adjustment-speed. 
Key Words: Fixed-term employment, labour demand, adjustment-speed
JEL classification: C23, J23, J41 
Acknowledgement: I wish to thank the Institute for Employment Research of
the Federal Labour Services in Germany (IAB) for the opportunity to work
with the IAB-Establishment Panel and for its hospitality. In particular, I am
grateful to Arnd Kölling of the IAB Establishment Panel Data Service for
giving me useful advice. I also thank Herbert S. Buscher, Wolfgang Franz,
Martin Falk and Viktor Steiner for their valuable comments.
§ Phone: +49 / 621 / 1235 -288, Fax: +49 / 621 / 1235 -225, e-mail: hagen@zew.de
11 Introduction
The regulation of fixed-term contracts (FTCs) in Germany has been in the focus
of the political debate for many years. After the liberalisations in 1985 and 1996,
the use of FTCs has been partially restricted in 2001. The main feature of FTCs is
that they constitute temporary employment relationships which do not raise any
institutional firing costs when the contract runs out. 
Supporters of a deregulation of FTCs argue that they may increase average em-
ployment by raising firms’ flexibility and weakening the wage setting power of in-
siders. Furthermore, FTCs may improve the chances of unemployed with low em-
ployment opportunities of finding a job since employers may be more willing to
hire if they can easily fire. However, there are many objections raised to this view.1
The use of FTCs may create a segmented labour market, where the employment
stability of the insiders with permanent contracts increases (and therefore the ad-
justment of permanent contract workers is decreased) by using the FTC workers
(outsiders) as a buffer against demand fluctuations.2 Firms may use FTC workers to
adjust to demand fluctuations and decrease the turnover of permanent contract
workers simultaneously. For this reason the rise in firms’ flexibility and the long-
term employment prospects of the outsiders may be much lower than expected.
Furthermore, the bargaining position of the insiders may be strengthened since
dismissals provoked by excessive wage settlements may affect FTC workers first
(Bentolila / Dolado, 1994).  
    Surprisingly, there is only little empirical evidence of the effects of the possi-
bility to hire FTC workers in Germany. While some research exists on the supply
side, i.e. multivariate analyses dealing with the characteristics of FTC workers3,
little is known about the effect of FTCs on the flexibility and adjustment-speed of
firms. Precisely this matter is the main argument for or against FTCs. 
There exists some indirect empirical evidence for Germany, being based on the
impact of the deregulation of FTCs on employment adjustment at the industry-level
without observing the actual amount of FTC employment. Hunt (2000) using in-
dustry-level data, finds that the deregulation of FTCs in Germany in 1985 had no
significant effect on employment adjustment in manufacturing. For this result she
provides the following explanations: either institutional firing costs are less impor-
tant than commonly thought or works councils and unions were able to pressure
                                             
1 See for example Blanchard / Landier (2001); Dolado et al. (2001).
2 However, this statement is based on the assumption, that the permanent workers are actually the
insiders, i.e. that unions protect exclusively the interests of permanent workers in the wage bar-
gain. 
3 See for example Schömann et al. (1995). 
2firms into converting more FTCs into permanent ones than firms wanted. Another
possible explanation, which is in line with the dual labour market theory, is that the
employment of FTCs reduces the turnover of permanent contract workers so that
the impact on total employment is smaller than expected. Using the same data
Abraham / Houseman (1994) also find no evidence for an adjustment-speed-
increasing effect of the deregulation of FTCs in Germany. The results in Kraft
(1993) even suggest a reduction in flexibility for 1985-87.  
Empirical analyses of the effects of FTC workers at the firm-level are available
for France and Spain. Goux et al. (2001) find in an analysis of French data that it is
far less costly for firms to adjust FTC workers to economic fluctuations than per-
manent contract workers. Furthermore, the transformation of FTCs into permanent
contracts seems to be an important instrument for permanent, i.e. long-term, labour
adjustment. Bentolila / Saint-Paul (1992) find with a panel of firms in Spain that
the adjustment of employment is faster with FTCs.4  
Indirect evidence on the relation of institutional firing costs and FTCs can be
found in Boockmann / Hagen (2001). They show empirically for West German es-
tablishments that there might be a negative correlation between the dismissal pro-
tection for permanent contract workers and the probability of employing FTC
workers. Therefore, institutional firing costs actually seem to be a reason for using
FTC workers. Furthermore, the probability of employing FTC workers is positively
influenced by positive demand shocks and the existence works councils. This may
be explained by the possibility of works councils to raise firing costs of permanent
contract workers by co-determination in case of dismissals.   
However, the available results for Germany do not include direct effects of FTC
workers on adjustment-speed. A natural approach to gain an insight into the role of
FTC workers in the adjustment process of firms is to estimate a dynamic labour
demand function at the firm-level. If FTC employment does not promote adjust-
ment, other reasons, such as screening candidates for permanent jobs, may be more
important for firms.5 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. The following section describes
the institutional background of FTCs in Germany and presents some descriptive
statistics about FTC workers in Germany. Section 3 discusses FTCs as an instru-
ment to cope with demand fluctuations by providing statistics about firms’ adjust-
ment strategies. Section 4 describes the specification and introduces the dataset.
Section 5 contains the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.  
                                             
4 See also Alonso-Borrego (1998) as well as Aguirregabiria / Alonso-Borrego (1999) for Spain.
5 This is a result found by Portugal / Varejão (2001) for Portugal.  
32 Fixed-Term Contracts in Germany
2.1 Institutional Background 
One possibility for firms to avoid firing costs due to dismissal protection is to en-
ter FTCs with new employees.6 FTCs expire automatically without dismissal at the
end of the agreed term. However, the use of FTCs is restricted by law. Until the
Employment Promotion Act of 1985, the only possibility of employing FTC work-
ers for a maximum duration of six months were the employers’ justification that
there are “objective reasons” in accordance with the civil code (Bürgerliches Ge-
setzbuch – BGB). Accepted reasons are seasonal fluctuations, temporary high vol-
umes of work, deputising a person, temporarily carrying out of special tasks, peri-
ods of work experience or on-the-job-training, public employment measures and
probationary periods. Renewals of FTC contracts (Kettenarbeitsverträge) are in
general only possible if the new contract is again justified by these reasons. If an
employment relationship is continued after the FTC has expired, the employment
contract is automatically transformed into a permanent contract. 
The use of FTCs was liberalised by the Employment Promotion Act in May 1985,
without changing the possibility of using FTCs in accordance with the civil code.
Under this Act employers now were free to hire new employees on FTCs without
“objective reasons” for a duration of up to 18 months. Renewals of FTCs under this
Act are possible up to the maximum fixed-term. Again, FTCs had to be converted
into permanent contracts if, on expiry of the contract, the worker was to be re-
tained. To prevent the opposite conversion from permanent into temporary em-
ployment contracts, FTCs are not permitted if the worker has been employed by the
same employer (on either type of contract) during a period of four months before
entering into the FTC. When the second Employment Promotion Act came into
force in October 1996, the maximum duration of FTCs was extended to 24 months,
and a maximum of three contract renewals were allowed. 
Only in exceptional cases FTCs are subject to collective bargaining. Also, works
councils have no mandate to negotiate with employers over the use of FTCs.
                                             
6 See Schömann et al. (1995) and Boockmann / Hagen (2001) for a further description of the insti-
tutional background in Germany. 
42.2 Who Are the FTC Workers?
Information about the skill-levels of FTC workers in comparison to permanent
contract workers can be found in the German Microcensus provided by the Federal
Statistical Office. The analysis of Boockmann / Hagen (2001) for West Germany
(without Berlin) in 1997 shows that, if the public service sector is excluded, 4.6 per
cent of workers are employed under an FTC.7 The share of female FTC workers is
4.9 per cent and therefore slightly above the share of male FTC workers with 4.4
per cent. On average the FTC workers have a lower skill level than the workers
employed under a permanent contract and FTC workers are more often unskilled.
23.1 per cent of the employees with FTCs have no vocational qualification com-
pared to 18.1 per cent of the employees with a permanent contract. 59.9 per cent of
the FTC workers and 71.3 per cent of the permanent contract workers have a voca-
tional training, an A-level without vocational training or are master craftsmen.
However, there is an exception to this trend: with 17.4 per cent the share of FTC
workers with a university degree is significantly higher than the share of permanent
employees with a university degree with 10.6 per cent. 
As mentioned above, a legally accepted reason for the use of FTCs is the proba-
tionary period of a new employee. Information about the significance of this reason
can also be found in the German Microcensus. Workers are questioned about the
reasons for being employed under an FTC. The alternative answers for West Ger-
many in 1997 are depicted in table 1.
Table 1: Workers’ Reasons for Being Employed under an FTC in
West Germany in 1997 (Percentages)
Reason All Men Women No vocational
qualification
Vocational
qualification
Cannot find a permanent job 19.1 19.7 18.3 21.3 15.9
Do not want a permanent job 5.0 3.8 6.5 4.0 7.3
Probationary period 20.7 22.7 18.0 24.2 14.5
Other reasons 55.3 53.7 57.2 50.6 62.4
Notes: Without public sector and employees in vocational training. The column “vocational
qualification” includes college and university degrees as well as persons with A levels
but without vocational training.  
Source: German Microcensus 1997. 
20.7 per cent of all FTC workers are in the probationary period. This relatively
high share suggests that flexibility might not be the only reason for firms to hire
                                             
7 For a multivariate analysis see Schömann et al.  (1995). 
5FTC workers. Women seem to have a higher preference for temporary contracts
than men: 6.5 per cent answer that they do not want to be employed permanently
whereas only 3.8 per cent of men give this reply. There are also significant differ-
ences between skilled and unskilled workers.
3 FTC Employment as a Means of Adjustment
Economic theory suggests that firms use temporary work to adjust more effi-
ciently to demand fluctuations. When firms expect larger demand fluctuations they
are more likely to use temporary work. By using temporary workers on the margin
of adjustment firms can insulate permanent workers from these fluctuations. Tem-
porary workers therefore help firms to avoid paying firing costs for permanent
workers (Saint-Paul, 1996).  
The comparative advantage of employing FTC workers rather than using other
quantitative adjustment instruments depends on institutional and economic factors.
For example, stock-keeping is often impossible in the service sector, implying that
other instruments of adjustment like flexible working time or FTC workers are
more important. 
Other important points are the adjustment costs for permanent contract employ-
ees. The higher the firing costs of permanent employees, the higher are the incen-
tives to employ FTC workers. The institutional firing costs of permanent workers
are induced by the dismissal protection regulation. Also works councils and collec-
tive wage agreements can raise firing costs of permanent employees. Furthermore,
works councils have to agree to the introduction of overtime or to the employment
of temporary workers provided by temporary help agencies.
Besides these institutional factors the nature of the shock determines whether
FTCs or other means of adjustment are used. In the 1996 survey of the IAB-
Establishment Panel, establishments were asked whether they experienced rather
expected or rather unexpected demand fluctuations during the year and which in-
struments of adjustment they used (Boockmann / Hagen, 2001). An interesting re-
sult is, that 10 per cent of the establishments, stating that they have expected de-
mand changes during the year, hire or fire staff whereas this share is 15 per cent
among the establishments with unexpected demand changes. This difference may
be explained by the firms’ strategy to avoid adjustment costs if the shocks can be
anticipated. Establishments which experience more often anticipated shocks during
the year adjust more frequently by shifting of holiday or free-time periods. FTCs
seem to be the third important adjustment instrument after shifting of holidays or
free-time periods and overtime. FTCs are used by 20 per cent of the establishments
6which experience more often expected demand changes and by 15 per cent of es-
tablishments which experience more often unexpected demand changes.
In the 1993 survey of the IAB-Establishment Panel, the establishments were
asked whether they had regular fluctuations and how they coped with them. The
question distinguished between adjustment instruments for positive and negative
changes in demand. In this way, asymmetric reactions of the firm may be taken into
account. Unfortunately the questions did not differentiate between FTCs and other
kinds of temporary employment. Table 2 contains the proportions of establishments
using the specified instrument relative to all establishments which were subject to
fluctuations in demand.
Table 2: Instruments of Adjustment to Increasing and Decreasing
Demand in West Germany in 1993 (percentages)
Increasing demand
Overtime hours / extra-shifts 49
Postponing holidays 24
Hiring temporary or FTC workers 29
Hiring new staff 11
Decreasing demand
Reducing overtime / extra shifts 35
Giving earlier holidays 27
Short-time working 7
Not replacing labour turnover 8
Dismissing staff / termination of contracts 12
Notes: Weighted and extrapolated data for West Germany. 
Source:  IAB Establishment Panel 1993  for West Germany.
The most important adjustment instruments for increasing and decreasing demand
seem to be overtime hours and extra-shifts. The employment of additional tempo-
rary workers is the second most frequently mentioned instrument of adjustment to
positive changes in demand. In contrast, the hiring or firing of staff seems to be
avoided by firms which may be explained by adjustment costs. 
Since the IAB-Establishment Panel is an annual dataset it is unfortunately impos-
sible to capture demand fluctuations during the year (seasonal demand changes) in
the estimation of the dynamic labour demand models. Furthermore, the IAB-
Establishment Panel (like most firm-level dataset) contains no information on the
working hours and the overtime of the permanent contract and FTC workers re
7spectively. For this reason, one important adjustment instrument is omitted. This
may lead to an underestimation of firms’ flexibility.  
       
4 Specification and Estimation Technique
The adjustment-speed of firms can be measured by dynamic labour demand mod-
els. The hypothesis that FTC workers raise firms’ adjustment is tested by an ap-
proach which is similar to the one in Bentolila / Saint-Paul (1992). A dynamic la-
bour demand for permanent contract labour only is estimated and the coefficients
are compared with those found for total labour demand. Permanent employment is
defined as firms’ total number of workers less the number of FTC workers. 
As a starting point, a standard dynamic labour demand model is used. It is as-
sumed that the adjustment costs are quadratic and symmetric. Equilibrium em-
ployment is determined by a Cobb-Douglas production function. According to the
closed-form solution of the price-taking firms’ optimisation problem the log of em-
ployment n of firm i in period t is (Nickell, 1986, 505),
 
 1 , 1 1 2ln lnit i t it ititn n Y w p v         (1)
with 0 1  , the anticipated output Y , the real wage rate w p  and an error term
itv .
The parameter  1  is close to 1 if the costs of adjustment are much higher than the
costs of being in disequilibrium, i.e. the situation when the actual employment
does not equal the desired level of employment. The lower the parameter 1  is, the
higher is the adjustment-speed towards the desired level of employment. The va-
lidity of the Cobb-Douglas technology can be checked by testing the null hypothe-
sis that 1 2 0   . The used dataset contains sales as a measure of output. The
wage rate is approximated by the total monthly wage bill divided by the total num-
ber of employees.
Equation (1) is compatible with static as well as rational expectations about the
variables influencing the desired level of employment (Hamermesh, 1993). How-
ever, by using firms’ expected instead of actual sales there will be no inference
made about the formation of expectations. It is assumed that the desired level of
employment depends on firms’ expected sales in the current year ( eitsales ) rather
than on actual sales.8 This approach helps reducing potential endogeneity problems
                                             
8 The establishments are interviewed by the 30th June. They are asked about an assessment of the
expected sales for the current year. 
8which may exist with actual sales (Gorter et al., 1997). Endogeneity problems are
very likely to occur in this case since the actual sales cover the whole year whereas
the employment stock is measured by the 30th of June in the dataset. Besides, using
expected sales has the advantage that the data has a longer time dimension since the
actual sales of an establishment are asked in the following year, i.e. one cross-
section would be lost if the actual sales were used. However, as Gorter et al. (1997)
show, the estimated coefficients of the expected output are significantly lower than
the coefficients for the actual output which may be explained by the fact that en-
dogeneity of the actual output leads to an overestimation of the effect. According to
Gorter et al. (1997) the adjustment parameter seems to be robust against the speci-
fication of the output variable.   
Including these variables one obtains the estimation equation
1 , 1 1 2ln ln
e
it i t it it itn n sales wage v      .              (2)
Sales and wages are deflated with the price index of net output for different indus-
tries provided by the Federal Statistical Office. 
The analysis is based on the IAB-Establishment Panel 1995 until 2000 for West
Germany.  This is a yearly survey of the demand situation of the labour market.
The dataset has been available for research since 1999. However, due to data confi-
dentiality laws in Germany, it is not possible for researchers outside the Federal
Labour Service to access the data directly. For this reason, all data operations were
carried out with the help of the IAB-Establishment Panel Data Service at the Fed-
eral Labour Service Offices. 
The unit of observation of the data is not the company, but the establishment
(Kölling, 2000). Since German regulation of the labour market often relates to the
establishment (not the company), this principle of data collection is well-suited for
the analysis. The population of the panel consists of all West German establish-
ments with at least one employee covered by social security. Therefore, establish-
ments without any employee covered by social security are excluded, in particular
those establishments with only self-employed in the sense of the social security
system (farmers, artists, publicists) and public sector offices exclusively employing
civil servants. In each year, the establishments taking part in the survey are inter-
viewed on the number and structure of their employees as of June 30th. The inter-
views contain questions regarding the number of FTC workers at this date. 
The analysis excludes all establishments which do not report turnover as the
measure of their business volume. Therefore, we exclude non-profit organisations,
the government and agricultural sectors and financial institutions.
9As already mentioned above, one equation is estimated for total employment and
one for permanent employment only (total less FTC employment). By comparing
the estimated coefficients it is possible to make inference about the impact of FTC
workers on firms’ adjustment-speed (Bentolila / Saint-Paul, 1992). An alternative
approach would be to estimate a labour demand equation for FTC workers only and
compare it with the equation for permanent employment. However, since only
about 38 per cent of all establishments in the unweighted estimation sample employ
FTC workers, this would require a sample-selection model. Although dynamic
sample selection models for panel data are already available9, they have not been
used in applied research yet.  
Even though the IAB-Establishment Panel includes information on the establish-
ments’ wage bill for its labour force, the wages for FTC and permanent workers are
not reported. Furthermore, there is no information on working hours available.
Therefore, one has to include the total wage bill divided by total employment in the
equation for total employment as well as in the equation for permanent employ-
ment (see for a similar approach Bentolila / Saint Paul, 1992). For this reason the
estimated coefficients should be interpreted with care.   
In order to obtain a reliable estimate of the adjustment parameter 1  it is neces-
sary to include other variables which may affect employment and adjustment.
Therefore the share of women, skilled workers and part-time workers in firms’ total
labour force are included (see for a similar approach Kölling, 1998). Furthermore,
dummy variables indicating whether the establishment has a works council or is
bound to a collective wage agreement at industry-level or firm-level are included.
In the IAB survey, establishments are asked whether they expect problems with the
workforce due to sickness, maternity leave or problems concerning skill shortage or
lack of new recruits. Accordingly four dummies are created and their lagged values
are included. All these variables may affect adjustment and the level of (FTC and
permanent) employment (see Abraham, 1988 as well as Boockmann / Hagen,
2001). Also dummy variables indicating whether the establishment has made any
investments in the preceding year are included in some specifications. We differ-
entiate between investment in information and communication technologies and
other investments. These dummy variables may affect firms’ levels of equilibrium
employment and shall again control for skill shortage, which has been an important
issue in West Germany during the last years of the estimation period. 
 The analysis is performed with the Arellano / Bond (1991) one-step dynamic
panel data estimator since OLS is inconsistent in the presence of lagged dependent
                                             
9 See for example Kyriazidou (1999). 
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variables among the regressors (Greene, 2000).10 This Generalized Method of
Moments estimator controls for individual fixed-effects by first differentiating the
equations. Individual fixed-effects may include all variables without any within-
variation such as industry affiliation and region. Also unobserved effects, such as
inter-firm differences in technology may be captured (Nickell / Whadhwani, 1991).
Furthermore, fixed time effects are included in order to capture the macroeconomic
fluctuations affecting all firms. The first-difference of the lagged dependent vari-
able , 1i tn   is instrumented by its lagged levels , 2i tn  ,.., , 1ii t Tn   . Since wages may be
determined simultaneously with employment, for example if trade unions bargain
with employers over wages and employment, they are treated as predetermined and
are instrumented by their lagged levels in some specifications in a similar way (see
Nickell / Wadhwani, 1991).    
Although the dataset contains the years 1995 until 2000 (i.e. T=6), the lagged en-
dogenous as well as the estimation technique which is based on the first-difference
and the instrumentation of , 1i tn  , imply that there are only those establishments
included which are observed at least for 4 years. This means that the number of es-
tablishments in our sample decreases from 4300 to about 1600. Descriptive statis-
tics for the estimation sample are depicted in table A1 in the appendix.
Bentolila / Saint-Paul (1992) slightly modify equation (2). In order to test the im-
plications of their theoretical model empirically, they include changes in the loga-
rithm (i.e. the growth rate) of sales instead of the logarithm of the level of sales as a
proxy for demand shocks (see Nickell / Wadhwani, 1991, for a comparable ap-
proach). Here a similar specification is used but the actual change in sales is re-
placed by the expected change in sales again.  
   1 , 1 , 1 2ln ln lneit i t it i t it itn n sales sales wage v           (3)
This specification will also be estimated to compare it with the results of Bentolila /
Saint-Paul (1992) for Spain.  
                                             
10 For a Monte Carlo study comparing different dynamic panel data estimators see Judson / Owen
(1999). For unbalanced panels with 10T   they recommend the one-step GMM estimator pro-
posed by Arellano / Bond (1991).  
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5 Estimation Results
The applied estimator is inconsistent in the presence of second-order autocorrela-
tion in the differenced residuals, whereas first-order autocorrelation does not affect
consistency (Arellano / Bond, 1991, 281-282). For this reason, the null hypothesis
of no autocorrelation is tested (see table 3 and 4). The tests suggest the presence of
first-order autocorrelation in many specifications whereas the null hypotheses of
second-order autocorrelation are rejected in all specifications. All reported t-ratios
are based on standard errors which are robust to general cross-section and time se-
ries heteroscedasticity. For each specification a Sargan specification test on the va-
lidity of the instruments is performed. The null hypothesis is that the over-
identifying restrictions are valid. It is not rejected in any specification. The Sargan
tests in table 3 and table 4 come from the corresponding homoscedastic estimator
since the asymptotic distribution is only valid in the case of i.i.d. errors (Arrellano /
Bond, 1991, 290). The null hypothesis of a Cobb-Douglas production function
could not be rejected in any specification.
In column (1) of table 3 the results for equation (2) are depicted. In this specifica-
tion the dummy variables for the investments in the preceding year are excluded
and wages are treated as exogenous, i.e. they are not instrumented. The estimated
adjustment parameter for the total employment equation 1  is 0.228 and therefore
smaller than the adjustment parameter of the permanent employment equation with
0.341. This result is in line with the expectation, that FTC workers may increase the
adjustment-speed of firms.11 
The values of the long-term output elasticities are unusually low. They are in all
specifications between 0.045 and 0.055 and they are slightly larger for permanent
employment.12 Flaig / Rottmann (1998) find with firm-level data of the West Ger-
man manufacturing sector in the period 1968-1995 a long-term output elasticity of
0.622, for example. The estimated low output-elasticity may be explained by the
short time period which includes only 1996 until 2000. In order to estimate a cor-
rect output elasticity it may be necessary that the estimation sample includes a
whole business. Also the use of first differences can bias the results. If there are
measurement errors in expected sales, they are exaggerated by the time differences
                                             
11 Second lags of employment were tried as well. They were insignificant in all specifications. This
is a surprising result since aggregation over labour with different adjustment costs may lead to at
least two lags (Nickell, 1986, 510). If one of the two types of labour is not associated with any
adjustment costs, then no second lag appears in Nickell’s (1986) framework. However, stating that
FTCs are not associated with any adjustment costs seems to be no plausible explanation. Aston-
ishingly, Bentolila / Saint-Paul (1992) have a similar result for Spain.   
12 The long-term output elasticity from a static labour demand model estimated with fixed-effects is
0.2. Results are available on request. 
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and bias the coefficient more towards zero than an estimation in levels (Roberts /
Skoufias, 1997). Another possible explanation is that we can not control for varia-
tion in working hours and therefore underestimate the impact of output changes.
Another already mentioned explanation is that the coefficient of the expected out-
put in dynamic labour demand estimations is often lower than the coefficient for
actual output (Gorter et al. 1997).  However, Kölling (1998) uses actual sales in-
stead of expected sales with the same dataset and estimation method for the period
1993 - 1996 and obtains also a long-term output-elasticity of 0.050. Possibly, these
results may be explained by the fact that the IAB-Establishment Panel is only on a
annual basis.13 
In column (1) the short-term wage elasticity 2  is –0.081 for total employment
versus –0.077 for permanent employment, the corresponding long-term wage elas-
ticity are –0.105 versus –0.106. A more negative coefficient of the wages in the
total employment equation could be interpreted as an indicator for a higher wage
elasticity in the demand for FTC workers. However, it should be kept in mind that
wages are not treated as predetermined in this estimation and that the wages may
contain at least two measurement errors: We only observe the average wage and
can not distinguish wages for permanent labour from wages for FTC labour. Fur-
thermore, the used wage rate is just the wage bill divided by the total number of
employees without taking working hours into account.
Accordingly, in column (2) the estimated coefficients are insignificant, if the
wages are treated as predetermined and are therefore instrumented. Likewise, the
estimated adjustment parameter for permanent employment is altered. The adjust-
ment parameter for permanent employment is still larger than the parameter for to-
tal employment, but the difference is smaller. The specification in column (3) of
table 3 includes dummy variables according to investment in the preceding year. It
can be seen that the results are only slightly changed.
                                             
13 See for a further discussion about sources of misspecification Griliches / Mairesse (1998).
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Table 3: Estimation Results of Equation (2)
(1) (2)
IV for wages
(3)
IV for wages
total perm total perm total perm
log employment (t-1) 0.228
(2.09)
0.341
(2.82)
0.197
(2.18)
0.223
(2.13)
0.203
(2.22)
0.214
(1.98)
log expected sales for the current
year
0.037
(1.77)
0.036
(1.68)
0.036
(1.70)
0.038
(1.89)
0.037
(1.73)
0.040
(1.98)
log (wages per worker) -0.081
(-4.29)
-0.077
(-4.12)
0.004
(0.03)
0.094
(0.48)
0.016
(0.13)
0.121
(0.61)
Share of skilled workers -0.050
(-2,54)
-0.050
(-2.22)
-0.062
(-2.22)
-0.074
(-1.97)
-0.065
(-2.35)
-0.079
(-2.11)
Share of female workers 0.070
(1.35)
0.052
(0.92)
0.065
(1.23)
0.044
(0.78)
0.067
(1.26)
0.043
(0.75)
Share of part-time workers 0.064
(1.63)
0.060
(1.21)
0.078
(1.63)
0.083
(1.27)
0.080
(1.67)
0.086
(1.33)
Wave 1999 -0.034
(-3.96)
-0.030
(-2.70)
-0.037
(-4.27)
-0.036
(-3.05)
-0.040
(-4.54)
-0.039
(-3.26)
Wave 2000 -0.044
(-3.44)
-0.044
(-2.36)
-0.049
(-3.80)
-0.053
(-2.93)
-0.054
(-4.17)
-0.059
(-3.21)
Expected problems due to gen-
eral staff shortage (t-1)
-0.000
(-0.02)
0.009
(0.89)
0.001
(0.12)
0.010
(1.08)
0.004
(0.50)
0.012
(1.35)
Expected problems due to skill
shortage (t-1)
0.003
(0.71)
-0.003
(-0.48)
0.002
(0.33)
-0.006
(-0.80)
0.004
(0.78)
-0.004
(-0.56)
Expected problems due to mater-
nity leave (t-1)
-0.008
(-1.06)
-0.006
(-0.48)
-0.005
(-0.69)
-0.000
(-0.04)
-0.008
(-1.06)
-0.002
(-0.20)
Expected problems due to sick-
ness (t-1)
-0.010
(-1.50)
-0.013
(-1.60)
-0.010
(-1.51)
-0.012
(-1.47)
-0.009
(-1.43)
-0.011
(-1.41)
Collective wage agreement: firm
level 
0.022
(1.57)
0.021
(1.41)
0.021
(1.49)
0.021
(1.41)
0.020
(1.44)
0.020
(1.33)
Collective wage agreement: in-
dustry level
-0.010
(-0.75)
-0.012
(-0.83)
-0.010
(-0.78)
-0.011
(-0.78)
-0.012
(-0.90)
-0.013
(-0.89)
Works Council 0.001
(0.09)
0.005
(0.25)
0.003
(0.22)
0.010
(0.50)
0.003
(0.22)
0.010
(0.46)
Investment in ICT (t-1) – – – – -0.015
(-1.29)
-0.018
(-1.50)
Other Investments (t-1) – – – – -0.018
(-1.69)
-0.020
(-1.62)
Constant 0.015
(3.12)
0.014
(2.12)
0.015
(2.93)
0.013
(1.90)
0.016
(3.05)
0.014
(1.95)
1st order autocorrelation (p-value) 0.0095 0.0036 0.0076 0.0103 0.0081 0.0136
2st order autocorrelation (p-value) 0.3985 0.4455 0.3115 0.4482 0.3535 0.4593
Sargan test  (p-value) 0.9191 0.8931 0.9929 0.8420 0.8895 0.6380
Wald test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 0.0006
Number of observations 2730 2701 2730 2701 2717 2688
Number of establishments 1472 1472 1472 1472 1466 1466
Notes: Values of the heteroscedasticity consistent t-ratios appear below the coefficients. The Wald
test is a test on the joint significance of the regressors excluding the constant.    
14
The finding that the difference between adjustment of total and permanent em-
ployment does not seem to be very important, should be interpreted with caution.
One has to keep in mind that the average share of FTC workers in the (unweighted)
estimation sample is only about 4.3 per cent. This share may be too small to obtain
larger differences.
In table 4 the estimation results of equation (3) are shown, which involves the ex-
pected growth rates of sales instead of the levels of the logarithm of expected sales.
This variable may be interpreted as a proxy for demand shocks (Bentolila / Saint-
Paul, 1992). In the specification in column (1) the investment dummies are ex-
cluded and wages are not instrumented. It can be seen that the coefficient for the
expected growth rates of sales is insignificant in the case of permanent employment
whereas it is significant at the 10 per cent level in case of total employment. This
result is compatible with the hypothesis that establishments use FTC workers to
cope with demand shocks.
The short-term wage elasticity of total employment is again smaller than the elas-
ticity for permanent employment. However, in column (2) can be seen that the co-
efficient for wages turns out to be insignificant if wages are instrumented. The re-
sult for the expected growth rates of sales is not altered, i.e. the coefficient for per-
manent employment is insignificant. In column (3) the variables for investment are
included. It can be seen, that the coefficient of the expected growth rates of sales is
now significant at the 5 per cent level in the equation for total employment whereas
it is still insignificant for permanent employment. 
Also the adjustment parameters have the expected magnitudes in all specifica-
tions. The differences between total and permanent employment are now more
clear-cut than in table 3.
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Table 4: Estimation Results of Equation (3)
(1) (2)
IV for wages
(3)
IV for wages
total perm total perm total perm
log employment (t-1) 0.202
(1.90)
0.363
(3.05)
0.197
(2.21)
0.261
(2.59)
0.211
(2.33)
0.257
(2.50)
expected growth rate of sales for
the current year
0.041
(1.83)
0.035
(1.38)
0.041
(1.91)
0.029
(1.27)
0.046
(2.08)
0.033
(1.38)
log (wages per worker) -0.065
(-3.78)
-0.060
(-3.41)
0.025
(0.22)
0.082
(0.48)
0.025
(0.21)
0.089
(0.50)
Share of skilled workers -0.055
(-2.86)
-0.055
(-2.44)
-0.069
(-2.56)
-0.077
(-2.18)
-0.070
(-2.54)
-0.079
(-2.20)
Share of female workers 0.097
(1.90)
0.071
(1.27)
0.088
(1.65)
0.060
(1.04)
0.092
(1.70)
0.061
(1.04)
Share of part-time workers 0.067
(1.83)
0.056
(1.14)
0.084
(1.90)
0.074
(1.25)
0.084
(1.88)
0.074
(1.25)
Wave 1999 -0.034
(-4.09)
-0.033
(-2.99)
-0.040
(-4.44)
-0.040
(-3.40)
-0.042
(-4.51)
-0.042
(-3.49)
Wave 2000 -0.043
(-3.54)
-0.045
(-2.51)
-0.052
(-3.91)
-0.056
(-3.18)
-0.056
(-4.11)
-0.061
(-3.37)
Expected problems due to gen-
eral staff shortage (t-1)
0.000
(0.01)
0.010
(1.00)
0.002
(0.26)
0.012
(1.28)
0.003
(0.44)
0.013
(1.43)
Expected problems due to skill
shortage (t-1)
0.003
(0.77)
-0.004
(-0.74)
0.002
(0.43)
-0.006
(-0.94)
0.004
(0.90)
-0.004
(-0.64)
Expected problems due to mater-
nity leave (t-1)
-0.010
(-1.52)
-0.005
(-0.44)
-0.008
(-1.10)
-0.001
(-0.07)
-0.011
(-1.52)
-0.004
(-0.32)
Expected problems due to sick-
ness (t-1)
-0.005
(-0.96)
-0.010
(-1.22)
-0.007
(-1.09)
-0.009
(-1.16)
-0.006
(-0.99)
-0.008
(-1.09)
Collective wage agreement firm
level 
0.019
(1.44)
0.012
(0.79)
0.019
(1.41)
0.012
(0.87)
0.019
(1.47)
0.013
(0.91)
Collective wage agreement in-
dustry level
-0.008
(-0.65)
-0.012
(-0.85)
-0.009
(-0.72)
-0.012
(-0.84)
-0.010
(-0.79)
-0.013
(-0.91)
Works Council 0.002
(0.12)
0.004
(0.18)
0.002
(0.18)
0.007
(0.35)
0.005
(0.36)
0.009
(0.43)
Investment in ICT (t-1) – – – – -0.015
(-1.37)
-0.019
(-1.71)
Other Investments (t-1) – – – – -0.016
(-1.62)
-0.020
(-1.64)
Constant 0.015
(3.29)
0.014
(2.19)
0.015
(3.29)
0.014
(2.26)
0.016
(3.49)
0.016
(2.41)
1st order autocorrelation (p-value) 0.0117 0.0019 0.0056 0.0047 0.0050 0.0065
2st order autocorrelation (p-value) 0.1822 0.4992 0.3256 0.4341 0.3492 0.4364
Sargan test (p-value) 0.9421 0.8436 0.9638 0.8669 0.9031 0.7242
Wald test (p-value) 0.0001 0.0017 0.0002 0.0091 0.0000 0.0088
Number of observations 3012 2982 3012 2982 2993 2963
Number of establishments 1601 1601 1601 1601 1593 1593
Notes: See Table 3.
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From the estimated coefficients of the lagged endogenous variables it is possible
to calculate the median length of the lag, i.e. the time it takes the establishment to
move halfway to the new equilibrium in response to a shock (Hamermesh, 1993,
248). It is obtained by solving for *t in *1 0.5t  . We get the following median lags
measured in months for the estimated adjustment parameters.14
Table 5: Median Lag (month)
Specification
(1) (2) (3)
total perm total perm total perm
Equation (2) 5.6 7.7 5.1 5.5 5.2 5.4
Equation (3) 5.2 8.2 5.1 6.2 5.3 6.1
The values in column (3) for equation (4) mean that the median adjustment of to-
tal employment towards a new equilibrium takes 5.3 months whereas permanent
employment needs 6.1 months. The difference may be explained by the use of FTC
workers. Again it can be seen that the estimated differences between permanent and
total employment are smaller in equation (3) than in equation (4).
6 Conclusion
The empirical analysis has found some evidence that FTC workers raise firms’
adjustment-speed. Therefore one may conclude that FTC workers raise the flexibil-
ity of firms and that FTCs are not exclusively used to screen prospective permanent
employees. For the interpretation it should be kept in mind that the share of  FTCs
is only about 4.3 per cent in the estimation sample. This amount of FTC employ-
ment explains, depending on the specification, between 0.2 and 3.0 months differ-
ence in median adjustment. 
The ratios of the estimated coefficients for the expected changes of sales of the
total and the permanent employment equations are smaller than the ratios of these
coefficients found by Bentolila / Saint-Paul (1992) for Spain, even though they find
                                             
14 Although the dataset is annual it is possible to calculate the median lag in months. If (and only if)
the true structure of the costs is symmetric and quadratic, changing the extent of temporal aggre-
gation (for example from monthly data to annual data) does not produce any clear bias to the esti-
mated length of the lag (Engle / Liu, 1972).  
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the adjustment-speed to be generally at a lower level. This may be explained by the
fact that the protection against dismissal for permanent workers is more restrictive
in Spain than in Germany, which implies generally lower adjustment-speed in
Spain on the one hand and a greater impact of FTC workers on adjustment on the
other.15    
A critical point may be that the analysis is based on an annual dataset. As Ha-
mermesh (1993) points out, this may be not appropriate to the estimation of dy-
namic labour demand models. This statement may be particularly relevant for our
issue since the duration of FTCs in Germany is often shorter than one year (see
Boockmann / Hagen, 2001). However, there is no other firm-level dataset available
containing information on FTCs in Germany.    
 The hypothesis that FTC workers are stronger affected by dismissals due to ex-
cessive wage settlements (which is the starting-point for a version of the insider-
outsider theory which defines FTC workers as outsiders and permanent workers as
insiders, see Bentolila / Dolado 1994) could not be validated. However, one should
keep in mind that the included measure of the wage rate is simply monthly wage
costs divided by total employment and that this regressor is used in the equation for
total as well as for permanent employment. The estimated coefficient may be bi-
ased by several measurement errors (see Bentolila / Saint Paul, 1992, 1032).
Further research is needed in this area. One should allow for asymmetries in the
adjustment costs (hiring versus firing) and apply alternative functional assump-
tions. Furthermore, the fact that fixed-term contracts can be transformed into per-
manent ones should be taken into account (see Goux et al., 2001). Besides, also the
wage elasticities of fixed-term contracts in comparison to permanent contracts,
which have important theoretical and policy implications, have not been considered
in Germany yet.    
                                             
15 However, the share of FTC workers in the dataset of BENTOLILA and SAINT-PAUL (1992) is with
7.6 per cent higher than in the IAB-Establishment Panel. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation Sample
Variable Data Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 4.011 2.005 0.000 9.908log (permanent employ-    
       ment) between 2.026 0.000 9.875
within 0.075 2.614 5.012
log (total employment) overall 4.047 2.014 0.000 9.944
between 2.035 0.000 9.917
within 0.060 3.515 4.612
Permanent employment overall 383.186 1325.045 1 20099
between 1279.184 1 19458
within 29.393 -257.814 1024.186
Total employment overall 400.243 1374.45 1 20821
between 1323.575 1 20279.67
within 21.930 -197.257 977.743
FTC employment overall 17.058 68.587 0 1663
between 62.212 0 1432.667
within 19.538 -433.609 419.724
log (expected sales) overall 16.088 2.541 10.269 24.264
(deflated) between 2.560 10.310 24.264
within 0.126 13.851 17.228
overall 7.943 0.726 4.312 9.485log (wages per worker)
between 0.719 4.750 9.485
(deflated) within 0.159 6.617 9.320
Share of skilled workers overall 0.584 0.300 0 1
between 0.284 0 1
within 0.102 -0.050 1.180
Share of female workers overall 0.404 0.294 0 1
between 0.291 0 1
within 0.054 -0.055 0.851
Share of part-time workers overall 0.230 0.245 0 1
between 0.239 0 1
within 0.063 -0.187 0.691
Investment in ICT (t-1) overall 0.604 0.489 0 1
(Dummy) between 0.448 0 1
within 0.241 -0.063 1.271
Other investments (t-1) overall 0.175 0.380 0 1
(Dummy) between 0.334 0 1
within 0.217 -0.492 0.841
overall 0.080 0.271 0 1Expected problems due to
general staff shortage (t-1) between 0.247 0 1
(Dummy) within 0.143 -0.587 0.746
overall 0.315 0.465 0 1Expected problems due to
skill shortage (t-1) between 0.426 0 1
(Dummy) within 0.231 -0.351 0.982
21
Variable Data Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 0.082 0.274 0 1Expected problems due to
maternity leave (t-1) between 0.251 0 1
(Dummy) within 0.128 -0.585 0.743
overall 0.130 0.337 0 1Expected problems due to
sickness (t-1) between 0.318 0 1
(Dummy) within 0.153 -0.537 0.797
overall 0.074 0.261 0 1Collective wage agree-
ment: firm level between 0.238 0 1
(Dummy) within 0.116 -0.593 0.740
Collective wage agree-
ment: industry level
overall 0.612 0.487 0 1
between 0.466 0 1
(Dummy) within 0.164 -0.055 1.279
Works Council overall 0.464 0.499 0 1
(Dummy) between 0.496 0 1
within 0.063 -0.203 1.131
Expected increase in sales overall 0.009 0.116 -1 2.8
(deflated) between 0.101 -1 1.55
within 0.070 -1.241 1.259
Notes: The between data are generated by calculating the means over time by establish-
ment ix . The within data are defined as it ix x x  , where the overall mean x  is added
to equate the mean of all data (overall, between and within). 
Source:  IAB Establishment Panel waves 5 – 8 for West Germany.
